East Asian Court Reform on Trial: Comments on the Contributions by Feeley, Malcolm M.
Washington International Law Journal 
Volume 27 
Number 1 East Asian Court Reform on Trial 
12-1-2017 
East Asian Court Reform on Trial: Comments on the Contributions 
Malcolm M. Feeley 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Courts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Malcolm M. Feeley, East Asian Court Reform on Trial: Comments on the Contributions, 27 Wash. L. Rev. 
273 (2017). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol27/iss1/11 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington International Law Journal by an authorized editor of UW 
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
Compilation © 2017 Washington International Law Journal Association 
EAST ASIAN COURT REFORM ON TRIAL: COMMENTS 
ON THE CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
Malcolm M. Feeley† 
 
Cite as: Malcolm M. Feeley, East Asian Court Reform on Trial: Comments on the 
Contributions, 27 WASH. INT'L L.J. 273 (2017). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
I am honored to have my book, Court Reform on Trial: Why Simple 
Solutions Fail, serve as the organizing framework for this symposium.1  The 
enterprise has proven valuable as it provided a reason to assemble a set of 
articles that focus on important changes in Asian courts in recent decades.  
Further, it appears that the reforms in three of the countries are loosely related 
to each other.  While Japan had a head start on judicial reforms, both Korea 
and Taiwan embarked on the same path as soon as they had shed authoritarian 
rule. China has pursued a more ambitious project.  Court reform is part of a 
massive effort to keep up with massive changes in society and the economy 
since the 1980s. 
 
I want to underscore that my book is a study of the failure of reforms 
in American criminal courts.  It is a study of failures even under best case 
conditions: where there were smart people, substantial resources, and broad-
based support.  The book was a sustained reflection on why good ideas were 
all but doomed to fail once they were put into effect.  I did not find a single 
fatal flaw that led to failure and which, if overcome, would lead to success.  
But I almost invariably found failure, or at least a lack of any meaningful 
increment of change, in the expected direction.  
 
My analytical framework drew from standard sources in organization 
theory and implementation studies.  It was divided into two parts: the first 
examined the stages of change and problems that arise in each of them.2  The 
second reflected on the nature of the criminal process and the adversarial 
                                                 
† Ph.D. U of Minnesota. Claire Sanders Clements Professor, School of Law, University of California 
at Berkeley.  I want to thank Setsuo Miyazawa for inviting me to participate in the conference that led to this 
symposium, the participants at that conference, and to other authors who have contributed to this symposium. 
I also want to want to thank David Johnson and Rosann Greenspan for helpful comments on an earlier draft 
of this article, and Maia Robbins for her fine editorial work.  
1  MALCOLM M. FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS FAIL (1983). 
2  FEELEY, supra note 1, at 35–39. 
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system in the United States, and emphasized its hyper-fragmentation.3  In my 
analysis of the stages of change, I emphasized the goal: what reformers 
wanted to achieve in the long term.  I worked through the different stages 
necessary to get from here to there.  They include: diagnosis, initiation, 
implementation, routinization, and evaluation.  At each of these stages, 
distractions, obstacles, and misinformation can easily lead reformers astray.  
 
Take some examples of how reforms can go astray at different stages.  
The public universally disapproves of disparity in sentences by race or age or 
social background, yet it persists.4  A common response to this is to try to 
restrict judicial discretion by establishing sentencing guidelines.5  This may 
help a bit, but it also raises other problems.  For example, not all relevant 
factors can be anticipated in advance, so sentencing under the new system 
results in new forms of inequality and does not overcome old forms.  
Furthermore, guidelines are likely to enhance the power of prosecutors to 
charge.  If so, disparities once visible in judges’ sentencing may now be swept 
under the rug by prosecutors’ selective presentation of facts and charges in 
plea bargaining.  Neither determinate sentencing schemes nor sentencing 
guidelines focus precisely on the original problem, say racial disparity in 
sentencing, so it may continue unabated as officials tinker with guidelines.  
Or, to consider another problem: a well-funded pilot program run by a highly 
motivated staff may work wonderfully, but once it is up and running with less 
funds and a smaller staff, it can turn into a nightmare.  New programs need to 
be carefully nurtured into maturity so that once made permanent, they have 
the resources and support they need to continue to work well.  
 
Though important, these observations are not deep insights.  Anyone 
who has undertaken a home renovation project or overseen even a modest 
curriculum reform in his or her academic unit is familiar with these sorts of 
issues.  Things can go awry at any moment and for almost any reason.  Key 
staff can depart; funding can be cut; programming can be co-opted; 
unanticipated obstacles can be encountered.  These are challenges that 
everyone who seeks to change things in public service encounters.  However, 
                                                 
3  Id. at 9–18. 
4 See generally William Rhodes et al., Federal Sentencing Disparity: 2005–2012 (Bureau of Justice 
Stats., Working Paper 2015:01, 2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fsd0512.pdf; Sonja B. Starr & 
M. Marit Rehavi, Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal Charging and Its Sentencing Consequences (Univ. 
of Mich. Law School Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 12-002), 
http://economics.ubc.ca/files/2013/05/pdf_paper_marit-rehavi-racial-disparity-federal-criminal.pdf. 
5 How Sentencing Generally Works, attorneys.com (November 10, 2017), 
http://www.attorneys.com/criminal-defense/what-are-mandatory-minimum-sentencing-laws. 
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they are compounded when applied to reforms of the American criminal 
process because the American criminal justice system is deeply fragmented 
by design and practice.  The theory of the adversary process is like the theory 
of the market; it is supposed to work best when each part pursues its own 
objectives without central control.  Furthermore, police are financed and 
supervised at the local level; corrections at the state level; courts at the county 
level.  There is no ministry of justice to oversee it; not at the local level, not 
at the state level, and not at the national level.  There are neither coherent 
political controls nor coherent bureaucratic controls.  In most places, there are 
not even meaningful criminal justice coordinating councils.  On top of this, 
courts deal with near-pathological problems that cannot be solved by more 
powerful social control institutions, such as the family, church, and school. 
 
It is this combination of factors––the various stages of securing change 
on the one hand and the seemingly intractable problems and fragmented 
features of the American criminal process on the other—that led me to try to 
reorient thinking about court reform.  Indeed, it led me to turn things upside 
down.  Instead of offering advice on how would-be reformers can keep their 
eye on the ball and achieve success, I started with the assumption that failure 
is normal and natural, and that success is rare and unexpected.  Feeley’s law 
of court reform: Unless a host of heroic conditions are present to overcome 
the myriad of built-in constraints, failure will almost certainly ensue.  Indeed, 
in the United States since the book was first published, still more reforms have 
been adopted and hundreds of billions of dollars spent to improve the criminal 
justice system; yet it is not clear that there have been any substantial 
improvements.  And, even if so, it is not clear that these improvements are the 
result of planning.  Most of the massive increases in funds were not used to 
develop more efficient and effective programs, but instead simply to arrest 
more people, impose harsher conditions on probation, increase the length of 
sentences, and restrict or eliminate parole.6  
 
Planned change with innovative and carefully evaluated reforms is rare.  
Furthermore, the handful of careful evaluations that have been completed 
almost always reveal failure or near-failure.  For instance, for nearly three 
decades between the late-1950s until the mid-1980s, as Court Reform on Trial 
                                                 
6  See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & AUSTIN SARAT, THE POLICY DILEMMA: FEDERAL CRIME POLICY AND 
THE LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, 1968–1978 (U. Minn. Press 1980). See also DAVID 
GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND THE SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (Oxford 
Uni. Press 2002); JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED 
DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (Oxford Uni. Press 2007).  
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shows, reformers in several big cities set out to reduce reliance of money bail 
and reduce the numbers of pretrial detainees.  Despite commitments, vast 
amounts of special funding, and the establishment of a number of promising 
programs, no lasting changes were produced.  Now, thirty to forty years after 
this concentrated effort, an even higher proportion of arrestees are held in jail 
before trial than fifty years ago.7  The same sort of desultory result holds for 
sentencing reforms and pretrial diversion.  Planned, thoughtful efforts at 
reform have made little or no difference and many appear to have been 
counterproductive.  Court Reform on Trial did not fully anticipate the effects 
of the war on crime that was just gaining strength as the book was finished; 
but it was, I think, spot on as to why even carefully planned court reform 
continues to fail in the United States. 8 
 
II. COURT REFORM ON TRIAL IN ASIA 
 
The articles in this symposium reveal that court reforms in Asia have 
followed a somewhat different path.  Most efforts have been relatively modest 
and with limited objectives.  Within these parameters, most have been at least 
partially successful, as best we can tell.  Certainly they have not been the 
spectacular failures that my book recounts for the United States.  Nor are the 
authors of the studies in this volume as pessimistic as I am.  
 
The differences are not due to the failure of the framework in Court 
Reform.  The authors of the case studies are faithful to the framework and 
employ it.  Some of the studies reveal how inchoate ideas took form and 
developed, and then were examined––at times, in depth and for several years.  
They were then formulated and modified in negotiations before being adopted 
and then altered again at the implementation stage, and once again as they 
were institutionalized.  Some were carefully evaluated; others were not.  Most 
of them have not been around long enough for anyone to be confident about 
their long-term effects.  Still, most of them are well past their birth stages.  
The headaches I described in conception, birth, and maturation are readily 
apparent in the accounts offered by the several authors.  Still, most have 
survived and, by their own terms, have been modestly successful.  The 
reforms are so different and the accounts so varied and dense that it is 
                                                 
7    See, e.g., Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stephenson, The Down Stream Consequences of 
Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711. 
8 See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 6. 
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impossible to summarize them here.  But after Setsuo Miyazawa’s helpful 
introduction to the symposium,9 they should jump out at the reader.  
 
What, then, underlies the disparity between my assessment of 
American reforms and those of the authors in this symposium?  Two reasons 
can account for it: differences in A) structure and B) substance.  
 
A. Differences in Structure 
 
In Court Reform on Trial, I identified three causes of dismal failure:  a 
dysfunctional adversary process, a fragmented criminal justice system, and a 
fragmented governmental system.   In contrast, the authors in this symposium 
all focus on civil law systems—systems common to most Asian countries.  
These systems may have some adversarial features, but are decidedly more 
integrated, centralized, and hierarchical than those in the United States.  
Although there are vast differences and ranges of examined reforms among 
the four countries under consideration in this symposium, all four countries 
share two features that distinguish them from the United States.  First, they 
are all unitary countries with one national justice system.  While some may 
be more decentralized than others, each has only one unitary criminal and civil 
justice system.  They have one judicial system.  They have one centralized 
prosecutorial system.  They have one central law enforcement system. They 
have one centralized penal system.  
 
In contrast, consider the United States.  The country is a federal system, 
yet it administers criminal justice almost entirely at the state and local level.  
Accordingly, there are fifty-plus criminal justice systems in the United States.  
Within the states, criminal justice administration and policy is decentralized. 
Although criminal law is adopted and applied statewide, it is administered 
locally.  This means that there is not one prosecutor’s office, but one for each 
county––58 in California, 254 in Texas, and 3142 nationwide.  There are 
roughly this many courts, with judges usually selected at the county level.  
Furthermore, there are over 18,000 separate law enforcement agencies; almost 
every city, town, or county, however small, has its own separate police force.  
Although nominally required to enforce and apply state law, local norms 
shape how the law is enforced and administered.  
 
                                                 
9  Setsuo Miyazawa, East Asian Court Reform on Trial: Introduction to the Symposium, 27 WASH. 
INT’L L.J. 1 (2017). 
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In short, the American criminal justice system is extremely fragmented. 
This means that policies adopted at one level must be administered by 
agencies at another level.  Their competence and priorities may be quite 
different.  For example, county-based prosecutors and judges are acutely 
aware that if they impose a term in the county jail when charging and 
sentencing convicted offenders (usually less than a year), the county must pay 
the costs of incarceration.  But, if the prosecutors send the offender to prison 
for one year or more, the state bears the cost of incarceration.  This factor is 
often of significant consideration in sentencing decisions.  
 
As another example, each of the four countries examined in this 
symposium has a powerful national ministry of justice whose major task is to 
oversee and coordinate criminal justice and judicial functions.  The United 
States federal government, states, counties, and cities do not have a ministry 
of justice.  There is no one in charge of thinking about—or even 
coordinating—common concerns in the administration of justice or reflecting 
on how changes in one place affect others elsewhere.  This tends to result in 
reforms which are often promoted by people from outside the system and with 
little buy-in from core justice system officials.  Alternatively, they are 
instituted by one agency in the system, with little support from others.  In 
either situation, reform is often like a child squeezing a balloon: she may 
squeeze it at one place, but it only pops out at another as the air shifts.  
 
Although Asian courts have this advantage, this by itself does not 
guarantee success.  As Miyazawa and Mari Hirayama’s article suggests, 
reforms may have their own pathologies in Asian courts as well.10  Still, 
whether a reform is initiated by a group within a ministry of justice or wholly 
outside it, at a minimum a central ministry is able to bring stakeholders, both 
inside and outside the government, to the table to seriously consider the 
reform.  It must be admitted, however, that a powerful ministry has the 
capacity to keep reform issues off the agenda and to ensure that they will 
garner no serious attention.11  Still, the various case studies of reform in this 
symposium all reveal that whether initiated from within or from without a 
ministry of justice, ministries eventually became central players in the 
planning process.  
                                                 
10   Setsuo Miyazawa & Mari Hirayama, Introduction of Videotaping of Interrogations and the 
Lessons of the Imaichi Case: A Case of Conventional Criminal Justice Policy-Making in Japan, 27 WASH. 
INT’L L.J. 149 (2017). 
11  See, e.g., DAVID T. JOHNSON, THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING CRIME IN JAPAN 
(2007) (offering a sustained comparison of Japanese and American criminal process in action).  
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In Japan, for instance, in each of the case studies of reforms, ministry 
officials and their allies were able to stall, co-opt those wanting more 
expansive reform, and narrow the range of options up for serious 
consideration.  In short, they dominated or almost dominated the process from 
start to finish.  For example, as Matthew J. Wilson’s article shows,12 Ministry 
officials were able to stall considerations of the reintroduction of the jury 
system for over forty years.  When they finally yielded, they defined the issue 
so narrowly that it all but gutted the bar’s original rationale for it, which was 
to curb the prosecutor’s domination of the courtroom and strengthen the 
position of the defense attorney.  Similarly, Miyazawa and Hirayama show 
how a plan to restrain the vast interrogation power attributed to police and 
prosecutors has increased the power of police and prosecutors.13  
 
B. Differences in Substance 
 
The second factor that distinguishes the Asian reforms from those I 
examined is substance.  My project focused on four reforms with well-defined 
substantive aims.  Bail reform was designed to reduce the number of arrestees 
held in jail prior to adjudication and reduce bail amounts; pretrial diversion 
was designed to redirect some jail-bound defendants into community 
programs that would allow them to avoid conviction and jail time; speedy trial 
reforms were designed to reduce time between arraignment and disposition 
and to reduce pretrial detention; and sentence reforms were aimed at reducing 
disparity.  Judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and other officials involved 
in the criminal justice system generally supported these changes.   
Furthermore, either Congress or state legislatures supported them with ample 
funding.  In short, they should have been “best case” examples of reforms.  
 
Still, for different reasons, the reforms have not produced their 
anticipated results and have been, in some instances, counter-productive.  
After years of reform efforts and numerous established special bail reform 
programs and pretrial release agencies, there is no evidence that they have 
produced these results. Thirty-five years later, the problem is worse.14  
Similarly, there is no evidence that pretrial diversion programs and speedy 
trial initiatives have worked.   Pretrial diversion was designed to redirect jail-
bound offenders into community programs where they would avoid both 
                                                 
12  Matthew J. Wilson, Assessing the Direct and Indirect Impact of Citizen Participation in Serious 
Criminal Trials in Japan, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 75 (2017). 
13  See generally Miyazawa & Hirayama, supra note 10.  
14  Heaton, Mayson, & Stephenson, supra note 7. 
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conviction and jail.  Over the past thirty years, study after study has shown no 
effect.  The vast majority of those enrolled in diversion programs would not 
have gone to jail absent the programs.  Instead, they would have received 
straight probation.15  These programs expand, rather than contract, the net of 
social control.16  Similarly, speedy trial rules may have reduced case-
processing times overall, but they do so by converging towards the mean.  
Some cases take less time, but others now take more time.  Sentencing reforms 
have, quite simply, led to disaster.17 
 
In contrast to the American reforms that I examined, all the reforms 
addressed at length in this symposium focus on process.  The aims of the most 
ardent proponents of the reforms were either indirect or obscure.  The 
Japanese bar mounted a decades-long struggle to revive the jury trial that once 
operated in Japan.  Its hope was that jurors would be independent enough to 
weaken the prosecutor’s hegemony in the criminal process so that jurors could 
exercise real power.18  This hope, however, was dashed when Parliament 
adopted a mixed jury system, in which lay jurors sit with professional judges.  
This arrangement does little if anything to weaken the powers of the 
prosecutor.  If anything, it provides a symbol of lay participation without 
much, if any, substance.19  Perhaps jurors will do more in the future, but I have 
seen no evidence that they will. 
 
Indeed, Wilson’s contribution in this volume emphasizes that jury trials 
have been extended to only a tiny handful of cases, and that evaluations focus 
almost exclusively on how smoothly the new jury system has been 
implemented.  The Ministry of Justice, he reports, is concerned with the “halo 
effect” of the new jury system—public support it has generated and the sense 
of efficacy that people feel after they have served on a jury.20   There has been 
                                                 
15  Thomas G. Blomberg, Penal Reform and the Fate of Alternatives, in PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL 
CONTROL: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SHELDON MESSINGER (2003). 
16  Stanley Cohen, VISIONS OF SOCIAL CONTROL (1985). This book brought this seemingly inevitable 
consequence to the fore in studies of criminal justice reform.  
17  MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND SENSIBILITY IN THE AMERICAN PENAL 
SYSTEM (Oxford Uni. Press 2004) (an excellent survey and analysis which reports on the counter-productive 
effects of American sentencing polices since the late 1970s are voluminous). See also GARLAND, supra note 
6; SIMON, supra note 6.  
18  At least this was the hope of the many Japanese lawyers I spoke to at meetings of the Jury Trial 
Study Groups in Osaka, Kobe, and Tokyo throughout the late 1980s.  
19  Wilson’s study, supra note 12, does an excellent job providing context and history of this reform 
and describing its reception. He seems to think the reform is a modest success. In addition, there is rapidly 
expanding literature in both English and Japanese that assesses the early experience with the new jury system 
in Japan.  
20  See Wilson, supra note 12, at 104. 
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virtually no attention to whether the jury system has shifted power relations 
among prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges.   
 
Similarly, Daniel H. Foote’s study traces the history of the bar’s effort 
to diversify the judiciary by recruiting mature, experienced, and 
independently-minded lawyers: people who could be skeptical of claims made 
by police and prosecutors and who would be less subservient to the judicial 
bureaucracy and Ministry of Justice.21  However, the effort resulted in a 
system that excluded such lawyers.  It instead promoted diversity by sending 
young assistant judges on postdoctoral-like experiences abroad or to work for 
law firms in Tokyo or Osaka—experiences that might be valuable, but not 
likely to weaken the hegemony of the judicial bureaucracy and the Ministry 
of Justice.22  Foote emphasizes that a number of practical factors stood in the 
way of more substantial changes, but he goes on to note that there were no 
serious efforts to overcome them because no one in the Ministry really wanted 
them.  The results were marginal changes that marginally useful.  But none of 
the grand objectives sought by those who initiated the reform effort were even 
pursued, let alone realized.23 
 
Japan’s new policy that allows victims to sit with judges on the bench 
during a criminal trial is fascinating to this American observer, since by 
American standards it is a major change.   In Japan, in some serious cases, the 
victim can now participate in the process, and even ask questions of the 
accused and offer statements to the court.  This appears to be a dramatic and 
unique change.  The United States accords victims no similar opportunities. 
In Japan, as in the United States, many cases are dropped early on in the 
process, but those that remain go on to trial.  In the United States, only a 
handful of even the most serious cases go to trial; almost all cases are resolved 
through plea bargains, leaving few trials in which victims could participate.24  
Of course, in the United States, victims appear as witnesses in open court 
hearings, both at trial and sentencing and in some pretrial hearings.  Likewise, 
in some states, victims have an opportunity to present a victim’s impact 
statement at sentencing, and some do so.  Still, they do not sit near the judge 
in the trial and intervene at will, as they now can in Japan.  An American 
might be concerned that a victim’s more active role in the guilt phase of the 
                                                 
21  Daniel Foote, Diversification of the Japanese Judiciary, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 7 (2017).  
22  Id. at 48. 
23  See id. at 66–68. 
24  Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and 
State Courts, J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 472–73 (2004).  
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trial would unduly influence the jury and judges, but this has not been a 
problem in Japan.  Conviction rates already approach 100% in Japan, so 
victim participation is unlikely to increase the likelihood of conviction, though 
of course it might influence the length of the sentence.25  Furthermore, in 
eighty percent of cases, victims decline to participate.  However, as Erik 
Herber concludes, this new policy “in itself can be qualified as a successful 
legal reform, or at least the beginning of one.”26  
 
Despite limits on the role of victims in the United States, this qualified 
success may have an American counterpart.  In the late 1970s, the criminal 
courts in Dade County, Florida began notifying victims of the court dates of 
their alleged assailants and inviting them to attend.27  This extended to plea 
negotiations that took place in open court, and victims were invited to 
comment on the proposed deal.  Researchers assessing this innovation 
reported two important findings: a vast majority of victims appreciated being 
invited to these meetings, but very few in fact showed up.28  
 
Miyazawa and Hirayama emphasize that the policies of diversification 
of the judiciary described by Foote, the introduction of lay judges discussed 
by Wilson, and the introduction of victim participation analyzed by Herber, 
were all extraordinary policies because they did not originate within the court 
system or the Ministry of Justice.  Instead, they were successfully pressed on 
the courts by forces outside the bureaucracy and, in two cases, outside the 
party system.  Despite this, as we have seen, the Ministry and the judicial 
bureaucracy were able to water down the proposals, adapt them to their own 
concerns, and then support changes that worked to their advantage.  
 
In contrast, the proposal to videotape police interrogations originated 
within the Ministry of Justice.  The proposal was initiated by a new reform 
Minister in response to scandals in several cases that revealed prosecutorial 
abuse of interrogations.29  Thus, presumably it had the weight of the 
government behind it.  Furthermore, the proposal was adopted by the Diet and 
is scheduled to go into full operation in 2019.  But between adoption and 
implementation, as Miyazawa and Hirayama show, the Ministry of Justice 
                                                 
25  Erik Herber, Victim Participation in Japan, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 119, 137–38 (2017). 
26  Id. at 147. 
27 Anne Heinz & Wayne Kerstetter, Pretrial Settlement Conference: Evaluating a Reform in Plea 
Bargaining, 13 L. & SOC’Y REVIEW 349 (1979). 
28  Id. 
29 Miyazawa & Hirayama, supra note 10. 
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quietly supported prosecutors and police who opposed it, and turned the law 
on its head.  
 
While initiated and adopted as a device to monitor prosecutors, the 
experimental use of videotaping of interrogations shows that it may become a 
new tool for prosecutors.  The caveats, qualifications, and exceptions built 
into the law and regulations ensure that prosecutors can videotape at their 
discretion and in ways that enhance their ability to obtain confessions.  
Miyazawa and Hirayama make a convincing case that videotapes will rarely, 
if ever, be used to challenge prosecutorial misconduct.  So, videotaping of 
confessions is a reform without content.  Indeed, it is worse; the reform is 
likely to give the appearance of improvement without any substance.  In this 
sense, it begins to look like court reforms in the United States, i.e., not just 
inconsequential, but counterproductive. 
 
Here, Miyazawa and Hirayama explain, important modifications 
quietly took place between initiation and the adoption.  After the modest 
proposal30 was introduced, it was sent to the Ministry of Justice where it was 
sliced and diced and used as part of a bargaining process involving other 
criminal justice matters.  The eventual law was announced with fanfare as a 
bold new policy, but as Miyazawa and Hirayama show, it had no bite.  
 
I think that Miyazawa and Hirayama intend their article to do much 
more than provide a pessimistic forecast for the future impact of this 
legislation.  Rather, they intend their case study to be an object lesson about 
how criminal justice reforms in Japan generally fare.  If so, their conclusions 
hit the mark.  The several Japanese case studies on reform––whether 
originated by powerful groups outside government or from within—point to 
the same general conclusions: it is not that conservatives always win; rather, 
bureaucrats in the Ministry of Justice always win.  They can co-opt change 
agents, study a proposal at length, identify and manufacture a thousand 
objections to a proposal, doggedly persist when others shift interest or are 
exhausted, and then promote a pale shadow of what was initially introduced. 
Something like this appears to be the case in the several bold new initiatives 
that were examined in the case studies on Japan.  
 
                                                 
30 Miyazawa & Hirayama, supra note 10, at 160–64 (emphasizing that the initiative was never directed 
at the police, who undertake interrogations which prosecutors heavily rely upon for their cases. Rather, it was 
aimed at only a tiny handful of salient cases in which prosecutors intervene to interrogate suspects). 
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The other three articles in this symposium address reforms in Korea,31 
Taiwan,32 and China.33  How do they fare in contrast to both the United States 
and to Japan? 
 
1. Korea 
 
Yong Chul Park’s article is one of three articles in this symposium that 
focuses on the introduction of lay participation in the criminal process.34  With 
the establishment of a stable democratic government in South Korea in 1987, 
the governing parties faced a dilemma: how to transform repressive 
governmental institutions into ones compatible with democratic values.  The 
judiciary was one such institution.  The Korean judiciary had been party to 
repression in the earlier non-democratic regimes.  The new democratic 
movement considered any number of creative reforms: replacing sitting 
judges, electing the judiciary, other forms of public participation in judicial 
selection, creating a constitutional court, including lay people on this court, 
and creating a jury system.35  Park’s analysis focuses on this last proposal in 
the context of certain criminal cases.  A law providing for jury trials was 
enacted and immediately instated in 2008.36 
 
Park identifies several reasons for the law’s limited success. In an early 
and highly-publicized case, a jury convicted the defendant, only to have the 
verdict overturned by the Supreme Court.  The reversal led many supporters 
of the reform to believe that the power of the new jury system was an empty 
promise.37  But Park identifies other more fundamental weaknesses of the 
jury.  It is supposed to “realize democracy in the criminal justice system,”38 
but it is not provided for in the Constitution.  Accordingly, he thinks that this 
lack of a constitutional foundation has precipitated endless debate among 
legal scholars, which has undercut the jury’s legitimacy.39  This may be true; 
I would like to see some evidence to support the claim.  More convincing is 
his analysis demonstrating that the jury trial—unlike its counterpart in 
                                                 
31  Yong Chul Park, Advance Toward “People’s Court” in South Korea, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 177 
(2017). 
32  Kai-Ping Su, Criminal Court Reform in Taiwan: A Case of Fragmented Reform in a Not-
Fragmented Court System, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 203 (2017). 
33  Margaret Woo, Court Reform with Chinese Characteristics, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 241 (2017). 
34 See also Foote, supra note 21; Su, supra note 32.  
35 Park, supra note 31, at 177–81. 
36  Id. at 179. 
37  Id. at 186.  
38  Id. at 199. 
39  Id. at 200–01. 
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Japan—is not mandatory and is only an option for the accused depending on 
the discretion of the court.  Furthermore, a jury verdict is only advisory.  The 
judge can disregard it, though Park reports that judges support the jury’s 
decision ninety percent of the time.40  Finally, jury trials are available in only 
a tiny handful of very serious offenses––and even then, in sexual assault cases, 
victims can request a judge to reject a defendant’s request for a jury trial.41  
 
It is not surprising, then, that only a very small portion of all criminal 
cases involve jury trials; in fact, only a fraction of that small group of cases 
permits jury trials.  Before the Jury Trial Act was adopted, it was estimated 
that there would at least be 300 jury trials a year in Korea—a tiny number to 
begin with given the population of the country.  But the actual number has 
been far less,42 and even after the law significantly expanded opportunities for 
jury trials, the number of jury trials has declined.43  As Park notes, “[a]ny 
future attempts to increase the number of criminal jury trials do not look 
promising.”44  He acknowledges that most people who have served on juries 
view their experience positively,45 but because there are so few jury trials and 
they are of such low visibility to the public, he cannot imagine them having 
any widespread effect on public opinion.  
 
2. Taiwan 
 
Kai-Ping Su’s analysis of court reform in Taiwan focuses on two 
important reforms that have been introduced since the new era of democracy: 
the “reformed adversarial system,” adopted in 2002,46 and the proposal for lay 
participation, which has been advocated for by the judiciary since at least 
2011.47  Su uses the first of these reforms as background for his analysis of 
the second proposed reform to permit laypeople to sit in court with judges.48  
Unlike Japan and other mixed systems, the judges’ proposal in Taiwan is to 
allow lay participation, but to give laypersons no formal role in decision-
making. 
 
                                                 
40  Id. at 190. 
41   Id. at 192–96. 
42  Id. at 190. 
43  Id.  
44  Id. at 198. 
45  Id. 
46  Su, supra note 32, at 204. 
47  Id. at 203. 
48  Id. at 204. 
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What is most intriguing about Su’s paper is the reform he takes for 
granted.  His study examines the mixed effects of reforms introduced in 2014 
against the backdrop of an even more important reform introduced in 2001. 
That reform established a complicated new hybrid judicial system. 49  He does 
not tell us who proposed it or how it came about, but thinks that it has been 
successful.  The reader infers this because Su identifies the tensions inherent 
in the judicial role that flow from a mixed adversarial and inquisitorial 
system.50  He seems to be saying that this relatively new hybrid reform is the 
cause of the judicial initiative to introduce lay participation.  The judicial 
concern, as he sees it, is that public opinion polls consistently reveal that 
judges are held in very low and declining esteem.51  Additionally, a series of 
high-profile corruption cases involving judges have further eroded public trust 
in the judiciary.52  These and various other concerns led Taiwan’s President 
Tsai In-Wen to establish a Judicial Reform Conference in 2014.53  It is 
comprised of 101 ordinary citizens, lawyers, judges, and government officials 
tasked with proposing ways to build a judicial system “belonging to the 
people, responding to the expectations of the people, and being trusted by the 
people.”54  Among the Conference’s priorities is the judges’ long-standing 
proposal to introduce lay participants into the criminal trial process.55  As Su 
notes, this proposal continues to be supported because of the judges’ strong 
belief that if the public sees them in action, it will view them more favorably.56  
 
Su argues persuasively that this proposal does not sufficiently tie its 
objectives to its likely effects. Indeed, he points out that a number of other 
reforms with much the same objectives have been adopted, but to no avail.  
Support for judges continues to plummet in public opinion polls.57 
Furthermore, he points to an assertion in Court Reform on Trial which holds 
that disillusionment about courts results in part from unreasonably high 
expectations on the part of victims and the public alike. 58  But his central 
point is that it is naïve to think that permitting lay participation will improve 
transparency and increase peoples’ trust in courts; this is especially true 
because so few cases would even permit lay participation and permitted lay 
                                                 
49  Id. at 206–07.  
50  Id. 
51  See id. at 228–36. 
52  Id. at 223–24. 
53  Id. at 226. 
54  Id. 
55  Id. at 225–27. 
56  Id. at 236–40. 
57  Id. at 235–36. 
58  See id. 
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participation would be severely circumscribed anyway.  The distance between 
the vague objective and the proposed action, Su argues, is therefore so great 
that it is unreasonable to expect it to have much impact. 
 
No doubt he is correct in this, but what intrigues me most is his assertion 
that the low opinion of judges was at least in part brought about by the reform 
that created the “hybrid” adversary-inquisitorial judiciary.  His claim seems 
to be that this change increased public expectations about courts while 
undermining their ability—or at least their perceived ability—to do their jobs 
effectively. In Court Reform on Trial, I argue that at times, the better a court 
performs, the worse it may look.59 Is this an example of that paradox?  
Perhaps.  However, I would like to see the evidence that links the decline in 
public support to changes in the court structure.  The proximate cause of low 
support for judges is likely a history of corruption, continuing scandals, and a 
well-publicized uproar over a court’s dealing leniently with a man charged 
with sexual assault of a young girl.  One also wonders to what extent the low 
grades given to judges may stem from a lingering resentment rooted in the 
long period of military and one-party rule that only ended in the 1990s.  How 
many of the current judges, for instance, also held office during this period of 
repression in which the courts were implicated? 
 
Most importantly, I would like to know more about the history of the 
apparently successful establishment of a hybrid judicial system that combines 
both adversarial and inquisitorial features.  Su suggests that such a change was 
possible because the Taiwanese political system is hierarchical and capable of 
taking decisive measures.60  Whatever the case, this seems a dramatic and 
potentially far-reaching change worthy of sustained analysis.  It seems to me 
that this, and not the introduction of lay participation, is the more important 
innovation. 
 
Still, Su’s skepticism over the proposal to introduce lay participation is 
warranted.  He notes that the courts have already introduced several other 
similar efforts to no avail, and there is no reason to think that lay participation 
will be any more effective.61  Furthermore, his skepticism is strengthened by 
Wilson’s and Park’s analyses of lay juries in Japan and Korea, neither of 
which report that the reforms have had any significant effects.  Despite this, 
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60  Su, supra note 32, at 239–40. 
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he does not identify any potential downside to the proposal.  At best, it may 
make little difference and at worst, no difference.  
 
3. China 
 
The court reforms in China that Margaret Y.K. Woo examines are of a 
completely different nature than the others considered in this symposium and 
in Court Reform on Trial.  In contrast to the incremental changes described in 
the other articles in this volume, Woo reports on a series of momentous 
changes in both law and the courts in China.  She characterizes these changes 
as “a reflection of national goals and identity.”62  She emphasizes that China 
has been in the midst of near continuous political upheaval since 1949 and, 
since the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1979, law and legal order have 
been central to plans for economic growth and political stability.63  She 
identifies a series of momentous changes that are designed to create, in effect, 
a dual legal system.  One system is designed to facilitate international trade 
and investment, where rules are clear and disputes can be settled smoothly 
and efficiently.  The second system is designed to manage internal domestic 
affairs, where disputes are handled under the watchful eye of the Communist 
Party which, if need be, can place its thumb on the scales of justice.64  
 
 However, Woo’s focus is on developing the state’s capacity to handle 
“ordinary” civil litigation.  Here, architects of the Chinese legal system have 
faced awesome challenges.  Among other things, in 1949 the new communist 
government did away with law, lawyers, and law schools, and returned to a 
version of traditional Confucian mediation with a communist twist.  In the 
1970s, with the shift to a modified market economy, modern law was 
introduced, and so too was Western-style regulation, courts, litigation, legal 
training, and lawyers.65  These changes had to be built from the ground up. 
Since the 1980s, the economy has grown by leaps and bounds in ways that 
have transformed society from top to bottom, and then transformed it again. 
The state and the guiding Communist Party have had to scramble to try to 
manage such rapid and extensive change.  Woo provides an account of how 
                                                 
62  Woo, supra note 33, at 242.  
63  Id. 
64  See, e.g., TAMIR MOUSTAFA, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: LAW, POLITICS, AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN EGYPT (Cambridge Uni. Press 2009); RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS 
IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES (Tamir Moustafa & Tom Ginsburg eds., 2008). It is not unusual for 
contemporary autocratic states to have one law for businesses in order to attract international investment and 
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65  Woo, supra note 33, at 242–44. 
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those charged with law, courts, and the design of the legal system—both 
administrators and Party officials—have coped with these overwhelming 
challenges.  Rapid change produced disruption on a massive scale, and 
ordinary citizens were swamped in a mire of legal problems, which were 
compounded by inefficient and corrupt public institutions.  The state 
responded by trying to establish rule by law, promulgating written 
administrative codes and regulations, creating courts, opening new law 
schools, and fostering a legal profession all in order to manage burgeoning 
legal needs, demands for meaningful resolution of disputes, and an end to 
corruption.66  Legal institutions faced the twin problems of coping with rising 
expectations and demands on the one hand and shifting priorities of the 
national government and Party on the other.67 
 
 Woo identifies two factors that account for the failure of the rule of law 
reforms of the 1980s.  The change from traditional, informal mediation to 
formal adjudication was too abrupt,68 and the new and more complicated 
system could not cope with the onslaught of demands brought about by the 
dislocations and disputes that flowed from rapid development.69 
 
 Her article describes how quickly the strong central government, 
supported by a strong central political party, was able to shift back to 
informality and a modified form of mediation, which was both much faster 
and cheaper.70  Overnight, judges were transformed from adjudicators into 
mediators. 
 
 However, mediation had its own problems.  Although faster and more 
efficient than litigation in resolving conflicts,71 it did little to establish 
precedents, clarify rules, and develop systematic procedures in ways that 
facilitate the development of a modern market economy.  In addition, Woo 
reports, local mediation was a recipe for favoritism and corruption.72 
However, the return to mediation allowed government officials time to come 
up with a new plan for a modern legal process that facilitated the rule of law, 
uniformity, and the reduction of localism and corruption.  They adopted an 
                                                 
66  See id. at 242–51. 
67  See id. (describing the economic and political forces guiding legal reforms in China). 
68  See id. at 267–69. 
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experimental approach, selecting a few regions in which to try out their new 
system and then proceeding by trial and error to expand their policies.73  
 
The reform Woo focuses on is the creation of a new type of appellate 
court for civil cases.  These courts are not appellate courts in the Western 
sense of the term.  They are proactive, not reactive.  They reach out to trial 
courts to identify and then review important decisions.  They do not listen to 
appeals from lower courts, affirm or correct errors, and then return cases to 
the trial courts for rehearing.  Rather, they reach out to identify significant 
cases and publish summaries of them in order to publicize important 
principles that add to and clarify the law.  It is common law on a fast track.  
 
These courts serve still other functions.  They are regional courts and 
thus are not closely connected with any particular region.  This serves two 
purposes: they are more likely to be drawn into provincial-wide corruption 
schemes and they are more likely to promote nationwide legal norms.  
Furthermore, judges on these tribunals are selected not only for their legal 
abilities, but also for their fidelity to the central government.  That is, they are 
not likely to be corrupt, and they are adept at shifting to follow Party 
policies.74  
 
 Woo reports that this approach appears to be working well.  The new 
circuit courts are able to develop legal principles and policies much more 
rapidly than conventional appellate courts.  Furthermore, because the circuit 
courts take their cues from national party leaders, they can shape the law in 
ways consistent with national policy.  Circuit courts can clarify legal policy 
and combat local corruption.  They are also effective at transmitting national 
directives on how to deal with troublesome issues and institutions—for 
instance, with regard to religious groups and non-governmental organizations 
pressing for increased freedom of expression and criminal defense attorneys 
seeking to zealously represent their clients.75  Indeed, the new circuit courts 
have played an active role in the increasingly repressive regime under the 
Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping.  
 
 
                                                 
73  Id. at 264–67.  
74  Id. 
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work, see SIDA LIU & TERRANCE HALLIDAY, CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN CHINA: THE POLITICS OF DEFENSE 
LAWYERS AT WORK (2016).  
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III. CONCLUSION 
The authors of the case studies in this symposium found it useful to 
work through the five stages of reform set out in Court Reform on Trial.  They 
found what I found: good ideas can flounder as they move from planning to 
implementation, and then to institutionalization.  Their accounts allow the 
reader to trace changes in the process—transformations of goals, shifts in 
stockholders, and measures of success.  Dreamers gave way to practical 
bureaucrats; expansive objectives were scaled downward and, at times, 
transformed into symbolic responses.  However, in most instances where giant 
steps were first announced, baby steps were eventually taken.  Still, in almost 
all instances, the final products are recognizable from the initial designs, just 
substantially scaled down and retooled, even if overblown in claim.  
 
Only in one country—China—were reforms dramatic and far-reaching; 
and these reforms were perhaps even more dramatic and far-reaching than 
their initial architects anticipated.  There, court officials, swamped with cases 
in an unworkable legal system and urged on by the Central Committee of the 
Community Party, undertook a series of far-reaching changes and 
implemented them.  When this bold initiative to replace mediation with formal 
adjudication became bogged down and overwhelmed, these same officials 
were charged with stepping back and rethinking the problems anew.  They 
came up with another even more dramatic solution which they also imposed 
quickly and decisively: back to mediation.  And then from this they moved 
on, again with bold plans. 
 
The new process was also substantially different.  They experimented 
with alternative ways to combine local decision-making with central 
oversight.  To do so, they devised a nuanced and complicated process that 
balanced competing interests in a stunning manner: handle cases 
expeditiously at the local level and promote consistency through centralized 
controls; provide better and faster justice; and create stronger centralized 
control that reduces corruption.  Part of me was inclined to stand up and cheer 
for this bold and brilliant act of judicial administration.  But then I realized 
that this scheme is designed in part to impose harsher methods of social 
control across China.  In light of this, decisiveness, effectiveness, and 
efficiency, especially in top-down, disciplined one-party countries, look 
somewhat less impressive. 
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Turning to the reforms in other countries, I have taken the liberty of 
suggesting that some of them were modest in scope and made for largely 
symbolic reasons. Therefore, they came with few consequences.  In my 
opinion, new provisions for lay participation fit this description.  So too do 
the projects to videotape interrogations and allow victims to participate in 
trials (though we have to await careful empirical investigation before any 
conclusion can be drawn).  Still, before I dismiss them as merely symbolic, it 
is important to remember that symbols are meaningful, and even symbolic 
reforms can be important.  The advocates of these reforms may be right; 
eventually some of them may promote more respect for, and understanding 
about, the criminal courts and public officials.  But even if they do not 
contribute in any measurable way to public support for the criminal justice 
system, there is no evidence that they have made things worse.  As we shall 
see shortly, this in itself is no small achievement.  The authors of the case 
studies in this symposium focus on one or two reforms, but some of them also 
identify others of significant import.  For instance, in Japan, the package that 
allowed for the creation of the jury system also provided for plea bargaining.  
In Korea, Park focuses on the stalled efforts to establish citizen participation. 
They did not have much effect, but he does acknowledge the success of the 
more far-reaching changes that established the reformed adversary system, as 
well as other reforms.  And, of course, Woo identifies a series of massive 
changes that were part of a successful campaign based on trial and error.  
 
Considering these reforms as a group, their impacts ranged from modest 
to symbolic successes.  Furthermore, most of them are aimed at altering 
processes: shifting from a judge-only to a collaborative judge and jury 
decision, allowing more citizen participation, marginally altering the 
recruitment process of judges, and the like.  In contrast, the innovations I 
assessed in Court Reform on Trial aimed to produce substantive changes: 
decrease pretrial detention, redirect jail-bound offenders to pretrial diversion 
and treatment programs, reduce case processing time, and reduce disparities 
in sentencing.  The problems I uncovered with these reforms is that in each 
case the results ran contrary to expectations: pretrial detention reforms did not 
decrease but increased pretrial detention; pretrial diversion caught up 
probation-bound and not jail-bound arrestees; speedy trial rules did not reduce 
delays, but shifted them; and sentence reform increased disparities and 
sentence lengths.  Despite good intentions, well-funded experimental 
programs, and well-intentioned advocates, they failed to make significant 
dents in the problems they addressed and usually made things worse.  Such 
was not the case with the reforms in Asia reported in this symposium.  The 
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reforms make a marginal difference at best and no substantial difference at 
worst.  The only obviously counter-productive innovation reported in these 
case studies was the introduction of videotaping of interrogations by 
prosecutors, which Miyazawa and Hirayama believe strengthens, rather than 
limits (as was its intention), the power of prosecutors.  And, of course, Woo’s 
description of the powerful and successful new circuit courts has ominous 
implications in a country in which the courts are under the sway of a single 
powerful political party.  
 
Of course, the sample size is too limited and the relevant explanatory 
factors too numerous to be able to make any firm conclusions about the 
conditions for success and failure.  But I want to conclude with a brief 
discussion of two possibilities that should be regarded as hypotheses and not 
explanations.  
 
First, the United States court reforms failed in part because they took 
on difficult substantive aims and were met with both opposition and 
indifference.  Even when they had considerable political and administrative 
support, they became bogged down in the hyper-fragmented system.  In 
contrast, Asian reforms took place in a quite different environment: the courts 
are hierarchical and closely associated with national ministries that can 
support (and often are the internal sources for) reforms.  When the 
bureaucracy is mobilized, it can fashion proposals that are likely to be adopted 
and institutionalized.  Of course, in the process, bold ideas can be replaced 
and transformed in all sorts of ways.  But reform can be embraced and 
effected.  
 
Second, the American criminal process is well established and stable.  
It may be highly dysfunctional as my discussion above suggests, but its 
components are entrenched and powerful.  Furthermore, this entrenched and 
powerful system is part of a larger legal system that is highly fragmented and 
is itself almost impervious to efforts at systemic change.  In contrast to the 
American legal system, those of Asia are brand new.  At the earliest, they 
were created after World War II and for years operated in a one-party state.  
China and Japan are still one-party states, although the differences between 
them are night and day.  But in China, the current legal system stems from the 
momentous changes beginning around 1980.  Similarly, in both Korea and 
Taiwan, the current legal system was created after shedding autocratic one-
party control in the very recent past––1987 in Korea and 2000 in Taiwan.  
Their legal systems within functioning democracies are in their infancy and 
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are not fully formed.  Every facet of their operation is characterized by change 
and experimentation, including the desire to distinguish themselves from the 
process during earlier autocratic periods.  Indeed, this same observation holds 
for their governmental systems as a whole: their institutions are new and still 
in the process of being formed.  Setting aside the special case of China, one 
might expect Japan to be a model for future development.  It has the oldest 
and most stable legal system, and its courts and Ministry of Justice appear to 
be the most rigid and the least receptive to change and experimentation.  If 
governments remain stable in Korea and Taiwan, we might then expect their 
criminal justice agencies and ministries of justice to follow suit.  If so, we can 
expect fewer reform initiatives and, when they do occur, to see them co-opted 
and domesticated by judicial bureaucracies and ministries of justice.  
 
 
